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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ROSALIND JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
VIRGINIUS "JINX" DABNEY,

Case No. 17601

Defendant-Respondent,
and
JAMES N. BARBER,
Defendant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
VIRGINIUS "JINX" DABNEY
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for professional negligence or legal
malpractice.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of
defendant-respondent Dabney and against the plaintiff, no cause
of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Dabney seeks an affirmance of the judgment
below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in appellant's brief 12
not complete, and in order to advise the Court fully as to the
factual background out of which this case arises we deem it
necessary to restate the facts.
We recognize that on this appeal plaintiff and appellant
is entitled to have the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom viewed in a light most favorable to her, and that if,
in any view of the evidence, a fair-minded jury could find in her
favor, and against the respondent, the judgment should be
reversed.

The facts set forth below are either established

without contradiction in the record, or if there is a dispute in
the facts, we have stated plaintiff's version of the facts for
purposes of this appeal.
The facts upon which the trial court based its ruling
are contained in allegations and admissions in the pleadings,
answers to various interrogatories propounded by one party to

t~

other, and the testimony of the plaintiff on her deposition.

The

pages of the deposition are not separately numbered as part of
the record.

References to the record will be prefaced by the

letter "R," and to plaintiff's deposition by the abbreviation
"Depos."
This action was initiated by the plaintiff as a malpractice action against two separate attorneys, defendant and
dent Dabney, and James N. Barber.

(R. 2-4).

respo~

Prior to trial,

summary judgment was entered in favor of defendant Dabney and
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against the plaintiff, no cause of action.

(R. 155-156).

The

action as against defendant Barber came regularly on for trial,
and was compromised and settled by the parties during trial for
the amount of $4000.

(R. 178, 181).

Plaintiff then commenced

this appeal as against defendant Dabney.

(R.

182-183).

Plaintiff first consulted with defendant Dabney in
approximately 1975.

(Depos. 12).

At that time, she and her hus-

band were the joint owners of a residential property located at
3201 Whitehall Drive.

(Depos. 4).

Plaintiff and her husband had

acquired the property by purchasing the prior owner's equity for
$2,100, and assuming the balance owed on the mortgage of $17,000.
(Depos. 10).

At the time plaintiff first consulted Dabney, this

residential property was encumbered not only with the unpaid
mortgage lien, the balance of which was then about $12,000, but
also by numerous judgment liens and tax liens.

(Depos. 10, 14

and 15; Exhibit 1 to deposition; R. 44 to 45 and 63 to 68).
The particular event which caused plaintiff to consult
Dabney initially was threatened foreclosure of a judgment lien in
favor of one Orson Gygi.

Dabney made appropriate arrangements

for settlement of that claim.

(Depos. 16).

Because many of the judgment liens were then several
years old, Dabney recommended that nothing be done about the
others

at that time, and that they be permitted to expire by a

lapse of time,

if this was possible.

However, plaintiff desired

to have all of these liens removed, if possible, and insisted
that Dabney write to all creditors and attempt to compromise all
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of the judgment debts for about 20 percent.

Dabney, in accor-

dance with her desires, undertook to do this, but only one creditor responded.

(Depos. 19 to 28; R. 70 to 80).

Dabney faithfully reported to plaintiff the results of
his efforts as evidenced by a series of letters.
Exhibits 5 to 14; R. 69 to 80).
1977.

(Depos.

The last letter was dated May 31

(Depos. 30; Depos. Exhibit 14; R. 80).
Plaintiff's next contact with Dabney was in June 1978,

more than a year later, after she received notice of a sheriff's
sale.

This was in connection with the foreclosure of another

judgment lien in favor of Grill Advertisement.

She took the

foreclosure papers to Mr. Dabney, and he indicated that he would
attempt to compromise the matter with the judgment creditor's
attorney and have the foreclosure sale called off.

In her pre-

sence, he called the other lawyer and asked him if he would stop
the sale for cash payment of $400.
other lawyer had agreed to do so.

Dabney advised her that the
She then delivered to Mr.

Dabney $400 in cash to stop the foreclosure sale.

A few days

later Dabney called her and advised that the judgment creditor's
lawyer had forgotten to stop the sale and that her house had been
sold.

(Depos. 31 to 33; R. 139-141).
Dabney then advised her that the best thing that she

could do at that point was to try to raise the $1,100 necessary
to redeem the home by December of that year.
34).

(R. 127; Depos.

$1,100 represented approximately the full amount of the

judgment, accrued innterest, and costs.
-

4 -

When plaintiff apprised
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her husband of this, he advised her to go to defendant Barber and
get the matter straightened out.

(Depos. 34).

Within one or two

weeks thereafter, she went to see Barber, and took all of the
pertinent documents to him.

(Depos. 35; R. 20, 115).

her there was nothing to worry about.

He told

She contacted Barber fre-

quently thereafter, and on a daily basis from December 1 to
December 13, the last day of the redemption period.
borrowed the $1,300 necessary to redeem the house.
to 36).

She had
(Depos. p. 34

However, she never received advice or instruction from

Barber as to the procedure to be followed in accomplishing the
redemption, with the result that the redemption period expired,
and her ownership rights were permanently extinguished.
After Dabney advised her in June of 1978 that she had to
come up with $1,100 to save her home, she had no further dealings
with him.

(R. 127).

(Depos. 37).

"After that I

talked to him no more."

Thereafter plaintiff relied upon Barber's

"assurance that he was looking into the matter and would see that
it was taken care of."

(Plaintiff's answers to Barber's interro-

gatories No. 7; R. 20).
She never advised Dabney that she had raised the money
to redeem the property, and never sought his advice or assistance
in accomplishing this.
In Summary:
(1)

Plaintiff's home was encumbered with liens in

excess of her equity in the home at the time she first consulted
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Dabney.

All of the liens long antedated the engagement of

Dabney's services, and he was in no wise responsible for their
existence.
(2)

Judgment lien foreclosure proceedings were pending

when plaintiff first consulted Dabney.

He undertook to compro-

mise and settle the judgment claim for $400.

Either through

misunderstanding with the attorney representing the judgment
ditor, or because of breach of faith on his

er~

(attorney for

judgment creditor) part, Dabney was unsuccessful in achieving
compromise settlement and preventing the foreclosure sale.
(3)

Thereafter, both Dabney and Barber repeatedly

advised the plaintiff that she could redeem the property by
paying off the full amount of the judgment, accrued interest, and
costs, in the approximate amount of $1,100.
(4)

After the foreclosure sale, plaintiff had no

further dealings with Dabney, and relied upon the advice of
Barber to save her home.

For reasons not explained, she failed

to pay the $1,100 amount, and her home was lost.
On this state of the record, defendant Dabney moved for
a summary judgment contending, first, that there was no evidence
in the record of any negligence upon his part; and secondly, that
even if his handling of the matter could be found to be negligent, plaintiff sustained no damages as a result thereof or, at
the most, no more than about $700, that is the difference between
the proposed compromise settlement figure of $400 and the actual
amount of the judgment lien.

The trial court ruled in favor of

- 6 -
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Dabney and entered judgment in his favor and against the plaintiff.

(R. 155 to 156).

Following trial and settlement of

plaintiff's claim against Barber, this appeal was initiated (R.
182) .

ARGUMENT
Plaintiff has broken her argument up into three separate
points or headings.

As we view the matter, there is only one

single issue before the Court--whether there is any evidence in
the record that defendant Dabney was guilty of legal malpractice,
and, if so, whether plaintiff sustained any damage as a result
thereof.

we, therefore, do not subdivide our argument into

separate points.
Our research has not discovered any case closely similar
in point of fact to the case at bar.

However, this case is

somewhat analogous to the recent decision of this Court in the
case of Hughes v. Housley v. Glen and Cotro-Manes, 599 P.2d 1250
(1979).

In that case, a claim was asserted against third-party

defendant (successor attorney to the defendant and third-party
plaintiff) for his failure to set aside a default judgment which
occurred during the time that defendant and third-party plaintiff
represented the plaintiff in the action.

This Court observed

that the position of the claimant, or third-party plaintiff, was
no worse for third-party defendant's lack of success in failing
to get the default judgment set aside.

So here, at the time

Plaintiff consulted with defendant, there was already a judgment

-

7 -
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of record against plaintiff which was a lien on her property in
the principal amount of approximately $750.

Plaintiff did not

have and could not raise the full amount necessary to satisfy the
judgment before foreclosure sale.

(R. 140; Depos. 32).

The

failure of the defendant to compromise and settle the action left
plaintiff in no worse position than she was before she consulted
defendant.

Paraphrasing the language of Hughes v. Housley, it

may be said:
"For assuming arguendo that Cotro-Manes
[DabneyJ was negligent in his handling of the
case, his negligence cannot be said to have
aggravated Hughes' [plaintiff's] injury or
added to the damage."
p. 1253.
We agree with appellant's contention that legal

malpra~

tice consists of the failure to use such skill, prudence and
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly
possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they
undertake, and that when such failure proximately causes damages,
it gives rise to an action in tort.

{Appellant's Brief p. 5).

However, plaintiff produced no evidence by way of affidavit,
deposition or otherwise, that this defendant was guilty of any
negligence or bad faith in his representation of the plaintiff.
No evidence was produced that ordinary care required that defendant reduce the proposed settlement agreement to writing, or that
he check with the sheriff to determine that the foreclosure sale
had been cancelled, or that he appear at the time and place of
the foreclosure sale.

Experience teaches that settlement

agreements are commonly made among lawyers orally, and although

- 8 -
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they are ordinarily ultimately reduced to writing, time
constraints sometimes prevent their being formalized in writing
prior to the occurrence of a specific event.

After the foreclo-

sure sale, he advised her fully and completely as to her rights,
and had she followed his advice her home would have been redeemed
within the redemption period.
Under any view of the evidence, the very most that could
be said against defendant Dabney is that he was unsuccessful in
his efforts to effect a compromise settlement of the judgment
debt for $400, and therefore plaintiff became obligated to pay
the total sum of approximately $1,100 in order to protect her
home from loss by foreclosure sale.

Assuming that the failure to

consummate the settlement resulted from Dabney's negligence, the
damage to the plaintiff would be the difference between the
amount of the proposed settlement agreement of $400 and the
amount which would have been necessary to redeem the property
($1,100).
It must also be remembered that at the time of the
foreclosure sale there were many other liens against the
plaintiff's home, exceeding in total the value of her equity in
it.

Had Dabney been successful in discharging the lien in

question, undoubtedly others would have been asserted and other
foreclosure proceedings brought.
Also to be remembered is that if Dabney had been successful in consummating a settlement of the judgment debt for
$400, or any other sum less than the amount of the judgment, he
- 9 -
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certainly would have been entitled to a reasonable attorney's
fee.

The record shows without dispute that he has been paid

nothing for his services.

The reasonable value of his services

in effecting a settlement would be a proper offset against any
amount which plaintiff would be entitled to recover.

Mullen and

Levit, Legal Malpractice, D§ 147-148, p. 213.
Plaintiff did not have, and does not claim to have, any
valid or meritorious defense to the judgment debt.

She was in

00

worse position by Dabney's having failed to compromise it than
she was before she came to him.

It is not malpractice to fail to

secure a favorable result for a client when a client has no valid
position; and if it can be said that Dabney was in any way negligent, plaintiff's recovery should be limited to nominal damages
only.

See 7 Am.Jr.

2d Rev. Ed., p. 270, Attorneys at Law, § 226.

Plaintiff's loss of her home resulted wholly from her
own negligence in failing to follow the advice of Mr. Dabney and
Mr. Barber to pay the amount of the judgment debt and costs in
the amount of $1,100 prior to the expiration of the redemption
period.

That portion of the loss, resulting from her own negli-

gence must be borne by her.

As said in Mullen & Levit, Legal

Malpractice, § 151, p. 217:
"There are occasions when the plaintiff
through his own neglect may have increased or
failed to reduce his damages.
Consequently,
the amount which is attributable to the
plaintiff, and not the attorney, should be
deducted from the total damages.
These damages are those which are increased by the
plaintiff's contributory negligence or which
should have been mitigated by the plaintiff."
(Emphasis added.)
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In summary, we respectfully submit:
1.

Plaintiff has demonstrated no negligence or bad

faith upon the part of Dabney and therefore has shown no basis
for recovery against him.
2.

Judgment was entered against plaintiff and was a

lien upon her property long before she consulted with Dabney, and
his failure to accomplish a compromise settlement of the judgment
debt left her in no worse position than she was before she consulted him.
3.

Even if it can be said that defendant Dabney was

negligent in failing to consummate a settlement on behalf of the
plaintiff for $400, or some other figure less than the amount of
the judgment debt, his maximum liability to the plaintiff would
be the difference between the amount of the proposed settlement
agreement ($400), and the amount that was necessary to redeem the
property by reason of the failure of the settlement agreement
($1,100), or $700, less an offset for reasonable attorney's fees.
Although it is unquestionably true that where there are
disputed issues of fact a case cannot be determined by summary
judgment, and must be submitted to a trier of fact on its merits:
it is equally true that summary judgment serves the salutary purpose of saving both courts and litigants the time, trouble, and
expense of trial, where there are no genuine issues of fact.

And

unsworn statements in pleadings cannot stand in the face of sworn
testimony by way of affidavit, answers to interrogatories, or
deposition.

Dupler v. Yates, 10 Ut. 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960),
- 11 -
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and Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 24 Ut. 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165
(1970).

We submit that this case is of the latter type.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above set forth,

the judgment below

should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL

By

~

~

, CJ d -i,; / ]
I <Ra~. ahristensen
I

900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone:
355-3431

84101
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